IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jobhdp/v100y2006i1p60-75.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modeling alliance activity: Opportunity cost effects and manipulations in an iterated prisoner's dilemma with exit option

Author

Listed:
  • Seale, Darryl A.
  • Arend, Richard J.
  • Phelan, Steven

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Seale, Darryl A. & Arend, Richard J. & Phelan, Steven, 2006. "Modeling alliance activity: Opportunity cost effects and manipulations in an iterated prisoner's dilemma with exit option," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 60-75, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:100:y:2006:i:1:p:60-75
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749-5978(06)00004-5
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    3. Yung‐An Hu & Day‐Yang Liu, 2003. "Altruism versus Egoism in Human Behavior of Mixed Motives," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 677-705, October.
    4. McCusker, Christopher & Carnevale, Peter J., 1995. "Framing in Resource Dilemmas: Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of Sanctions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 190-201, February.
    5. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Abraham Neyman, 1999. "Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is Not Commonly Known," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 45-64, January.
    7. Knez, Marc & Camerer, Colin, 2000. "Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 194-216, July.
    8. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    9. Parkhe, A & Rosenthal, EC & Chandran, R, 1993. "Prisoner's dilemma payoff structure in interfirm strategic alliances: An empirical test," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 531-539, September.
    10. Vanberg, Viktor J. & Congleton, Roger D., 1992. "Rationality, Morality, and Exit," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 418-431, June.
    11. Ashlock, Dan & Smucker, Mark & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," ISU General Staff Papers 199409010700001033, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. T. K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, 2000. "Instabilities of Strategic Alliances: An Internal Tensions Perspective," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 77-101, February.
    14. Mark de Rond & Hamid Bouchikhi, 2004. "On the Dialectics of Strategic Alliances," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 56-69, February.
    15. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
    16. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    17. Gérard P. Cachon & Colin F. Camerer, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 165-194.
    18. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 251-278, October.
    19. Steven E. Phelan & Richard J. Arend & Darryl A. Seale, 2005. "Using an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Exit Option to Study Alliance Behavior: Results of a Tournament and Simulation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 339-356, December.
    20. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    21. Binmore, Ken, 1999. "Why Experiment in Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 16-24, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Buckley, Peter J. & Cross, Adam & De Mattos, Claudio, 2015. "The principle of congruity in the analysis of international business cooperation," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1048-1060.
    2. Feng, Sinan & Liu, Xuesong & Dong, Yida, 2022. "Limited punishment pool may promote cooperation in the public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 165(P2).
    3. Rebekka Kesberg & Stefan Pfattheicher, 2019. "Democracy matters: a psychological perspective on the beneficial impact of democratic punishment systems in social dilemmas," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-13, December.
    4. Ching-Pin Chiu & Shih-Kung Lai, 2008. "A Comparison of Regimes of Policies: Lessons from the Two-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 35(5), pages 794-809, October.
    5. Uzea, F. Nicoleta & Fulton, Murray E., 2014. "Mechanisms for Effective Alliance Management: Insights from a Federated Cooperative Marketing System," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-32, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bogliacino, Francesco & Codagnone, Cristiano, 2021. "Microfoundations, behaviour, and evolution: Evidence from experiments," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 372-385.
    2. Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner, 2010. "Experimental economics: Where next?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Drakopoulos, Stavros A., 2022. "The Conceptual Resilience of the Atomistic Individual in Mainstream Economic Rationality," MPRA Paper 112944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua, 2015. "Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    6. Chad W. Seagren & David Skarbek, 2021. "The evolution of norms within a society of captives," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(3), pages 529-556, July.
    7. Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2017. "Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 329-348.
    8. Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, July.
    9. Hayo, Bernd & Vollan, Björn, 2012. "Group interaction, heterogeneity, rules, and co-operative behaviour: Evidence from a common-pool resource experiment in South Africa and Namibia," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 9-28.
    10. Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2016. "Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 737-767.
    11. Jacobs Martin, 2016. "Accounting for Changing Tastes: Approaches to Explaining Unstable Individual Preferences," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 67(2), pages 121-183, August.
    12. Pessali, Huascar & Berger, Bruno, 2010. "A teoria da perspectiva e as mudanças de preferência no mainstream: um prospecto lakatoseano [Prospect theory and preference change in the mainstream of economics: a Lakatosian prospect]," MPRA Paper 26104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
    14. Abhijit Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard, 2021. "Does reducing inequality increase cooperation?​," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2021_022, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    15. Müller, Stephan & Rau, Holger A., 2017. "Decisions under uncertainty in social contexts," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 290, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics, revised 2017.
    16. Anya Savikhin Samek & Roman Sheremeta, 2014. "Recognizing contributors: an experiment on public goods," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(4), pages 673-690, December.
    17. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2005. "Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    18. Francesco GUALA, 2010. "Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate," Departmental Working Papers 2010-23, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    19. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Dohmen, Thomas, 2014. "Behavioral labor economics: Advances and future directions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 71-85.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:100:y:2006:i:1:p:60-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.