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Prisoner's dilemma payoff structure in interfirm strategic alliances: An empirical test

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  • Parkhe, A
  • Rosenthal, EC
  • Chandran, R

Abstract

Interfirm strategic alliances (ISAs) are proliferating rapidly. The mixed motive--competitive and cooperative--nature of ISAs is hypothetically captured by the prisoner's dilemma (PD) model. Until now, empirical research in realistic business settings into the payoff structure obtained in ISAs has been lacking. After examining the incentives inherent in the PD payoff structure, this study presents the results of a US nationwide mail survey of 342 senior executives recently involved in ISAs. The results corroborate the existence of a payoff structure which satisfies the PD payoff structure. Some implications for promoting cooperative behavior as well as future research directions are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Parkhe, A & Rosenthal, EC & Chandran, R, 1993. "Prisoner's dilemma payoff structure in interfirm strategic alliances: An empirical test," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 531-539, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:21:y:1993:i:5:p:531-539
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    Cited by:

    1. Yoon Koh & Seoki Lee, 2013. "Stock Market Reactions to US Hotel Firms' Strategic Alliances," Tourism Economics, , vol. 19(2), pages 373-391, April.
    2. Puliga, Gloria & Urbinati, Andrea & Franchin, Enrico Maria & Castegnaro, Stefano, 2023. "Investigating the drivers of failure of research-industry collaborations in open innovation contexts," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    3. Steven E. Phelan & Richard J. Arend & Darryl A. Seale, 2005. "Using an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Exit Option to Study Alliance Behavior: Results of a Tournament and Simulation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 339-356, December.
    4. Seale, Darryl A. & Arend, Richard J. & Phelan, Steven, 2006. "Modeling alliance activity: Opportunity cost effects and manipulations in an iterated prisoner's dilemma with exit option," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 60-75, May.
    5. Delerue, Hélène, 2018. "Shadow of joint patents: Intellectual property rights sharing by SMEs in contractual R&D alliances," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 12-23.
    6. Uzea, F. Nicoleta & Fulton, Murray E., 2014. "Mechanisms for Effective Alliance Management: Insights from a Federated Cooperative Marketing System," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-32, February.

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