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Attentional role of quota implementation

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  • Matveenko, Andrei
  • Mikhalishchev, Sergei

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new role of quotas, e.g. labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) manager. We find that quotas induce attention: a RI manager who is forced to fulfill a quota, unlike an unrestricted RI manager, never rejects minority candidates without acquiring information about them. We also demonstrate that in our model quotas are behaviorally equivalent to subsidies. In addition, we analyze different goals that the social planner can achieve by implementing quotas. First, quotas can eliminate statistical discrimination, i.e. make the chances of being hired independent from the group identity. Second, when the hiring manager has inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of candidates' productivities, the social planner can make the manager behave as if she has correct beliefs. Finally, we show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Matveenko, Andrei & Mikhalishchev, Sergei, 2021. "Attentional role of quota implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001733
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105356
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    2. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
    3. Pavel Ilinov & Andrei Matveenko & Maxim Senkov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Optimally Biased Expertise," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp736, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    4. Anna Sobczak & Ewa Chomać-Pierzecka, 2024. "Challenges and Opportunities for the Development of Polish Enterprises in the Face of Crisis Threats," World, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-18, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Discrete choice; Rational inattention; Multinomial logit; Quotas;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies

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