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Attention Management

Author

Listed:
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Laurent Mathevet
  • Dong Wei

Abstract

Attention costs can cause some information to be ignored and decisions to be imperfect. Can we improve the material welfare of a rationally inattentive agent by restricting his information in the first place? In our model, a well-intentioned principal provides information to an agent for whom information is costly to process, but the principal does not internalize this cost. We show that full information is universally optimal if and only if the environment comprises one issue. With multiple issues, attention management becomes optimal: the principal restricts some information to induce the agent to pay attention to other aspects.

Suggested Citation

  • Elliot Lipnowski & Laurent Mathevet & Dong Wei, 2020. "Attention Management," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 17-32, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:2:y:2020:i:1:p:17-32
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190165
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, March.
    2. Harris, Christopher J, 1985. "Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 613-628, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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