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Motivating emissions cleanup: Absolute vs. relative performance standards

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  • Mullins, Jamie T.

Abstract

This article empirically compares the effectiveness of relative versus absolute performance standards in motivating compliance actions. By leveraging a unique set of Chilean administrative panel data, I examine a natural experiment created by a change in the performance standard used to incentivize the reduction of particulate matter in the atmospheric emissions of stationary pollution sources in the Santiago Metropolitan Region. I find that the absolute standard drove ∼21% less emissions cleanup than did the relative standard. I also demonstrate how sharp heterogeneity in responses to the change in standards is predictable based on an ex-ante identifiable type-categorization, which leads to the broadly-applicable conclusion that stricter regimes drive more compliance actions when imposed via an absolute performance standard compared to a relative standard. The extension of this framework provides a general means of anticipating whether an absolute or relative performance standard will drive higher rates of compliance actions in other settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Mullins, Jamie T., 2018. "Motivating emissions cleanup: Absolute vs. relative performance standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 66-92.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:66-92
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.05.007
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Absolute standard; Relative standard; Air pollution; Air quality policy; Regulatory uncertainty; Environmental regulation; Chile; Criterion-referenced standard; Norm-referenced standard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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