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Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows

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  • Ambec, Stefan
  • Dinar, Ariel
  • McKinney, Daene

Abstract

By signing a water sharing agreement (WSA), countries agree to release an amount of river water in exchange for a negotiated compensation. We examine the vulnerability of such agreements to reduced water flows. Among all WSAs that are acceptable to riparian countries, we find out the one which is self-enforced under the most severe drought scenarios. The so-called upstream incremental WSA assigns to each country its marginal contribution to its followers in the river. Its mirror image, the downstream incremental WSA, is not sustainable to reduced flow at the source. Self-enforcement problems can be solved by setting water releases and compensations contingent to water flow. We apply our analysis to the Aral Sea Basin. We compute the upstream incremental compensations for the Bishkek agreement and asses its vulnerability with historical flows.

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  • Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2013. "Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 639-655.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:639-655
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.06.003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ricardo Martinez & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2024. "Fair allocation of riparian water rights," Papers 2407.14623, arXiv.org.
    3. Ansink, Erik & Gengenbach, Michael & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 122860, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    4. Li, Zhi & Zhang, Xin & Xu, Wenchao, 2018. "Water Transactions along a River: A Multilateral Bargaining Experiment with a Veto Player," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274048, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Lea Melnikovová, 2017. "Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 1393-1401.
    6. Pauline Pedehour & Lionel Richefort, 2022. "Empowerment of Social Norms on Water Consumption," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 625-655, July.
    7. Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold, 2016. "Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 92-117.
    8. Benjamin Ouvrard & Stefan Ambec & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2022. "Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 605-635, October.
    9. Hurt, Wesley & Osório, António (António Miguel), 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/237596, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    10. Araujo, Rafael, 2024. "The value of tropical forests to hydropower," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    11. Ert, Eyal & Cohen-Amin, Shier & Dinar, Ariel, 2019. "The effect of issue linkage on cooperation in bilateral conflicts: An experimental analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 134-142.
    12. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Benjamin Ouvrard & Raphaële Préget & Arnaud Reynaud & Laetitia Tuffery, 2020. "Nudging and Subsidizing Farmers to Foster Smart Water Meter Adoption," Working Papers hal-02958784, HAL.
    14. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2019. "Decentralized mechanisms for river sharing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 67-81.
    15. Benjamin Ouvrard & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Alban Thomas & Dishant Jojit James & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2023. "Distributive Justice in the Field: How do Indian Farmers Share Water? ," Working Papers hal-04150233, HAL.
    16. Osorio, Antonio, 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," MPRA Paper 56690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard, 2021. "River pollution abatement: Decentralized solutions and smart contracts," IFRO Working Paper 2021/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, revised Oct 2021.
    18. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2016. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/266574, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    19. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2015. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 807-831, April.
    20. Hojjat Mianabadi & Erik Mostert & Saket Pande & Nick van de Giesen, 2015. "Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 29(7), pages 2303-2321, May.
    21. Rupayan Pal & Dipti Ranjan Pati, 2020. "Corruption vs. Efficiency in water allocation under uncertainty: Is There a trade-off?," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2020-029, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    22. Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu & Weijun He & Liang Yuan & Jian Hua Zhao, 2016. "Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(12), pages 4451-4466, September.

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