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Water Transactions along a River: A Multilateral Bargaining Experiment with a Veto Player

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  • Li, Zhi
  • Zhang, Xin
  • Xu, Wenchao

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  • Li, Zhi & Zhang, Xin & Xu, Wenchao, 2018. "Water Transactions along a River: A Multilateral Bargaining Experiment with a Veto Player," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274048, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:274048
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274048
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.
    2. R. Maria Saleth & Ariel Dinar, 2004. "The Institutional Economics of Water," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3443.
    3. Charles Regnacq & Ariel Dinar & Ellen Hanak, 2016. "The Gravity of Water: Water Trade Frictions in California," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1273-1294.
    4. Rosegrant, Mark W. & Binswanger, Hans P., 1994. "Markets in tradable water rights: Potential for efficiency gains in developing country water resource allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(11), pages 1613-1625, November.
    5. Tremewan, James & Vanberg, Christoph, 2016. "The dynamics of coalition formation – A multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 33-46.
    6. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
    7. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2013. "Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 639-655.
    9. Dinar, Ariel & Hogarth, Margaret, 2015. "Game Theory and Water Resources Critical Review of its Contributions, Progress and Remaining Challenges," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 11(1-2), pages 1-139, June.
    10. Bonnie G. Colby, 1990. "Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1184-1192.
    11. Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2017. "River coalitions and water trade," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 453-469.
    12. Kachelmeier, Steven J. & Limberg, Stephen T. & Schadewald, Michael S., 1991. "Fairness in markets: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 447-464, September.
    13. R. Maria Saleth & Ariel Dinar, 2004. "The Institutional Economics of Water : A Cross-Country Analysis of Institutions and Performance," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14884.
    14. Desai, Sreedhari D. & Sondak, Harris & Diekmann, Kristina A., 2011. "When fairness neither satisfies nor motivates: The role of risk aversion and uncertainty reduction in attenuating and reversing the fair process effect," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 32-45, September.
    15. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-741, September.
    16. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Álvarez, Xana & Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2019. "Risk prevention of land flood: A cooperative game theory approach," MPRA Paper 91515, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    Keywords

    Experimental Economics; Natural Resource Economics; Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis;
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