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Hot Stuff: Would Climate Change Alter Transboundary Water Sharing Treaties?

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  • Ambec, Stefan
  • Dinar, Ariel

Abstract

By signing an international river sharing agreement (RSA), countries voluntary commit to release water in exchange for a compensation. We examine the robustness of such commitments to reduced water flows. We focus on RSAs that satisfy core lower bounds and fairness upper bounds. We characterize the constrained upstream incremental RSA as the core and fair RSA that is sustainable during the most severe droughts. It assigns to each country its marginal contribution to its followers, up to its maximal benefit from water extraction. It lexicographically maximizes the welfare of the most upstream countries in the set of core and fair RSAs. Its mirror image, the downstream incremental RSA, is not sustainable to drought at the river source.

Suggested Citation

  • Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel, 2010. "Hot Stuff: Would Climate Change Alter Transboundary Water Sharing Treaties?," IDEI Working Papers 656, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:23886
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2002. "Sharing a River," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 453-462, December.
    2. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2008. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 249-266, October.
    3. Moulin, Herve, 1990. "Uniform externalities : Two axioms for fair allocation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 305-326, December.
    4. Janmaat, Johannus & Ruijs, Arjan, 2007. "Sharing the load? Floods, droughts, and managing international rivers," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 573-592, August.
    5. Lynne Lewis Bennett & Charles W. Howe & James Shope, 2000. "The Interstate River Compact as a Water Allocation Mechanism: Efficiency Aspects," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-1015.
    6. D. Kilgour & Ariel Dinar, 2001. "Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 43-60, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pauline Pedehour & Lionel Richefort, 2022. "Empowerment of Social Norms on Water Consumption," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 625-655, July.
    2. Kim Hang Pham Do & Ariel Dinar & Daene Mckinney, 2012. "Transboundary Water Management: Can Issue Linkage Help Mitigate Externalities?," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-20.
    3. Pham Do, Kim Hang & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation," MPRA Paper 37408, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international river agreement; water; stability; core; fairness; global warming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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