Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction
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- Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 1999. "Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2134, The World Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 14898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 19021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mansuri, Ghazala, 2007. "Credit layering in informal financial markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 715-730, November.
- Tharakan, Joe & Lefèvre, Mélanie, 2011.
"Intermediaries, transport costs and interlinked transactions,"
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- LEFÈVRE, Mélanie & THARAKAN, Joe & ,, 2013. "Intermediaries, transport costs and interlinked transactions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pasquale Commendatore & Martin Currie, 2006.
"A Dynamical Analysis Of Alternative Forms Of Agricultural Land Tenure,"
Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 443-463, November.
- EP Commendatore & M Currie, 2002. "A Dynamical Analysis of Alternative Forms of Agricultural Land Tenure," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0201, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Debapriya Sen, 2005. "Sharecropping, interlinkage, and price variation," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-10, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Kumar, Sunil Mitra, 2013. "Does Access to Formal Agricultural Credit Depend on Caste?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 315-328.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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