Trading between agents for a better match
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.09.002
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More about this item
Keywords
Search agent; Multiple principals multiple agents; Externality; Moral hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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