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Belief elicitation in political protest experiments: When the mode does not teach us about incentives to protest

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  • Canen, Nathan
  • Chakraborty, Anujit

Abstract

Many recent experiments studying political protests elicit subjects' beliefs and actions, before and after an information intervention, to assess the causal role of beliefs on actions. We show that unless beliefs are symmetric and unimodal, using a belief elicitation scheme that is mismatched with the research question may affect the magnitude and even reverse the sign of identified effects. We provide a simple characterization of when such a sign reversal occurs. As an example, we revisit Cantoni et al. (2019)'s influential study of whether political protests are strategic complements or substitutes. We show how their belief elicitation method allows, in theory, a novel and alternative interpretation of their results, which could have been avoided with a different method.

Suggested Citation

  • Canen, Nathan & Chakraborty, Anujit, 2023. "Belief elicitation in political protest experiments: When the mode does not teach us about incentives to protest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 320-331.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:216:y:2023:i:c:p:320-331
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.018
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Belief elicitation; Experimental designs; Identification; Political protests;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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