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Subjective Probabilities and Scoring Rules: Experimental Evidence

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  • Robert G. Nelson
  • David A. Bessler

Abstract

This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects in a probability forecasting experiment. Results suggest that theory holds when subjects forecast over many periods, although inexperienced subjects may fail to exploit the dominant strategy in the initial periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert G. Nelson & David A. Bessler, 1989. "Subjective Probabilities and Scoring Rules: Experimental Evidence," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(2), pages 363-369.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:71:y:1989:i:2:p:363-369.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1241594
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    Cited by:

    1. Delavande, Adeline & Giné, Xavier & McKenzie, David, 2011. "Measuring subjective expectations in developing countries: A critical review and new evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 151-163, March.
    2. Canen, Nathan & Chakraborty, Anujit, 2023. "Belief elicitation in political protest experiments: When the mode does not teach us about incentives to protest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 320-331.
    3. Caroline Roussy & Aude Ridier & Karim Chaïb, 2014. "Adoption d’innovations par les agriculteurs : rôle des perceptions et des préférences," Post-Print hal-01123427, HAL.
    4. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Stephanie W., 2009. "On eliciting beliefs in strategic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 98-109, August.
    5. Langrock, Ines & Hurley, Terrance M., 2006. "Risk Preferences, Perceptions and Systematic Biases," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21343, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Sherrick, Bruce J., 2002. "The Accuracy Of Producers' Probability Beliefs: Evidence And Implications For Insurance Valuation," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-17, July.
    7. Casillas-Olvera, Gabriel & Bessler, David A., 2006. "Probability forecasting and central bank accountability," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 223-234, February.
    8. Robertson, Matthew J., 2018. "Contests with Ex-Ante Target Setting," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 47, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    9. Ivanov, Asen, 2011. "Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 366-394, March.
    10. Keith Coble & Zhijun Yang & M. Darren Hudson, 2011. "Using experimental economics to evaluate alternative subjective elicitation procedures," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(14), pages 1729-1736.
    11. Nolan Miller & Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, 2005. "Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(9), pages 1359-1373, September.
    12. David Danz & Lise Vesterlund & Alistair J. Wilson, 2020. "Belief Elicitation: Limiting Truth Telling with Information on Incentives," NBER Working Papers 27327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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