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Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

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  • Wang, Stephanie W.

Abstract

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 x 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Stephanie W., 2011. "Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 30-33, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:30-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    5. Yun Wang, 2015. "Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    6. Canen, Nathan & Chakraborty, Anujit, 2023. "Belief elicitation in political protest experiments: When the mode does not teach us about incentives to protest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 320-331.
    7. Drerup, Tilman & Enke, Benjamin & von Gaudecker, Hans-Martin, 2014. "Measurement Error in Subjective Expectation and the Empirical Content of Economic Models," MEA discussion paper series 201414, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
    8. Dai, Zhixin & Hogarth, Robin M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2015. "Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 146-162.
    9. Angela C M de Oliveira & John M Spraggon & Matthew J Denny, 2016. "Instrumenting Beliefs in Threshold Public Goods," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(2), pages 1-15, February.
    10. Karl Schlag & James Tremewan & Joël Weele, 2015. "A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 457-490, September.
    11. Ersoy, Fulya, 2023. "Effects of perceived productivity on study effort: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 376-391.
    12. Yun Wang, 2023. "Belief and higher‐order belief in the centipede games: An experimental investigation," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 27-73, February.
    13. Olga Shurchkov, 2013. "Coordination and learning in dynamic global games: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 313-334, September.
    14. Karl Schlag & James Tremewan & Joël Weele, 2015. "A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 457-490, September.
    15. Asa B. Palley & Mirko Kremer, 2014. "Sequential Search and Learning from Rank Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(10), pages 2525-2542, October.
    16. Dieckmann, Anja & Fischbacher, Urs & Grimm, Veronika & Unfried, Matthias & Utikal, Verena & Valmasoni, Lorenzo, 2015. "Trust and beliefs among Europeans: Cross-country evidence on perceptions and behavior," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 04/2015, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    17. Lina Lozano & Ernesto Reuben, 2022. "Measuring Preferences for Competition," Working Papers 20220078, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Aug 2022.
    18. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Rasocha, Vlastimil, 2021. "Experimental methods: Eliciting beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 234-256.
    19. Leder, Johannes & Häusser, Jan Alexander & Mojzisch, Andreas, 2015. "Exploring the underpinnings of impaired strategic decision-making under stress," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 133-140.
    20. David Danz & Lise Vesterlund & Alistair J. Wilson, 2020. "Belief Elicitation: Limiting Truth Telling with Information on Incentives," NBER Working Papers 27327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Foster, Gigi & Frijters, Paul, 2014. "The formation of expectations: Competing theories and new evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 66-81.
    22. Drerup, Tilman & Enke, Benjamin & von Gaudecker, Hans-Martin, 2017. "The precision of subjective data and the explanatory power of economic models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 200(2), pages 378-389.

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