IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v141y2017icp151-163.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are public and private enforcement complements or substitutes? Evidence from high frequency data

Author

Listed:
  • DeAngelo, Gregory
  • Humphreys, Brad R.
  • Reimers, Imke

Abstract

A substantial theoretical literature identifies two general approaches to deterring non-norm conforming behavior: public law enforcement to monitor and punish proscribed behavior, and private (community) enforcement to discourage both illegal and legal norm defying activities. Recent papers highlight the importance of both enforcement approaches but empirical identification of their relative effects has been challenging. Utilizing a novel, event-level database from the National Hockey League, we examine the separate and interactive effects of law enforcement (referees) and community, vigilante justice (fighting) on non-conforming behavior. We find that the timing of events is crucial in determining the effectiveness of the different types of enforcement. Community enforcement is effective only when law enforcement is lacking. Conversely, law enforcement actions are effective both independently and in conjunction with community enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • DeAngelo, Gregory & Humphreys, Brad R. & Reimers, Imke, 2017. "Are public and private enforcement complements or substitutes? Evidence from high frequency data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 151-163.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:151-163
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117301671
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreas Fuster & Stephan Meier, 2010. "Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 57-70, January.
    2. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2013. "Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 28-73.
    3. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    4. Ellickson, Robert C, 1989. "A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 83-97, Spring.
    5. S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, 2016. "Ostracism and Forgiveness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2329-2348, August.
    6. Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, 2015. "A Theory of Civil Disobedience," NBER Working Papers 21338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Stephen G. Donald & Kevin Lang, 2007. "Inference with Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(2), pages 221-233, May.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2017. "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 245-295.
    9. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    10. DeAngelo Gregory & McCannon Bryan C., 2016. "Public Outcry and Police Behavior," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 619-645, April.
    11. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    12. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 567-588.
    13. Peter T. Leeson, 2009. "The Laws of Lawlessness," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 471-503, June.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001179, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    16. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Duane W. Rockerbie, 2016. "Fighting as a profit maximizing strategy in the National Hockey League: more evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(4), pages 292-299, January.
    18. Kniffin, Kevin M. & Mihalek, Vince, 2014. "Within-series momentum in hockey: No returns for running up the score," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 400-402.
    19. Avinash K. Dixit, 2007. "Economics With and Without the Law, from Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance," Introductory Chapters, in: Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press.
    20. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
    21. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    22. Benson, Bruce L & Mast, Brent D, 2001. "Privately Produced General Deterrence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 725-746, October.
    23. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    24. Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, 2011. "Public Safety through Private Action: an Economic Assessment of BIDS," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(552), pages 445-462, May.
    25. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chávez, Carlos A. & Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2018. "Managing and defending the commons: Experimental evidence from TURFs in Chile," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-246.
    2. Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2021. "Private protection and public policing," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 5-28, February.
    3. Carl Kitchens & Matthew Philip Makofske & Le Wang, 2019. "“Crime” on the Field," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(3), pages 821-864, January.
    4. Craig A. Depken & Peter A. Groothuis & Mark C. Strazicich, 2020. "Evolution Of Community Deterrence: Evidence From The National Hockey League," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 289-303, April.
    5. DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura Katherine, 2018. "Peers or Police? Detection and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 11540, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Gregory DeAngelo & Adam Nowak & Imke Reimers, 2018. "Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 183-191, January.
    7. Gregory DeAngelo & Matthew Gomies & Rustam Romaniuc, 2023. "Do civilian complaints against police get punished?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 453-482, September.
    8. DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura K., 2020. "Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 210-227.
    9. Steeve Mongrain and Matteo Pazzona, 2024. "Public Policing and Private Security: Insights from the UK," Discussion Papers dp24-06, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    10. Gila Albert & Dimitry Bukchin & Tomer Toledo, 2021. "Evaluation of a Public Technology-Based Traffic Enforcement Program," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(21), pages 1-13, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
    2. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    3. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
    4. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    5. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
    6. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    7. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L., 2019. "Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 169-176.
    8. T. Randolph Beard & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & Michael L. Stern, 2014. "Security and Government Credibility," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2014-07, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    9. DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura Katherine, 2018. "Peers or Police? Detection and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 11540, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Vincent Geloso & Louis Rouanet, 2023. "Ethnogenesis and statelessness," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 377-407, June.
    11. Alexander Fink, 2012. "The Hanseatic League and the Concept of Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 194-217, May.
    12. Daniel Smith, 2014. "Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 183-197, June.
    13. Fahn, Matthias & MacLeod, W. Bentley & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2023. "Past and Future Developments in the Economics of Relational Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 16427, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Skarbek, David, 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 702-716, November.
    15. Leonid Krasnozhon & John Levendis, 2018. "Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 75-90, February.
    16. Cristina Bicchieri, 2002. "Covenants without Swords," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 192-228, May.
    17. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
    18. Koyama, Mark, 2012. "The Law and Economics of Private Prosecutions in Industrial Revolution England," MPRA Paper 40500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Sanchez-Pages Santiago & Straub Stéphane, 2010. "The Emergence of Institutions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, September.
    20. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 21457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deterrence; Public and private law enforcement; Community enforcement; Norm conformance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Z2 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:151-163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.