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Ostracism and Forgiveness

Author

Listed:
  • S. Nageeb Ali
  • David A. Miller

Abstract

Many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation: if an individual shirks in one relationship, her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her, while continuing to cooperate among themselves. However, a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk, rather than report her victimization truthfully. If guilty players are to be permanently ostracized, then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement. Ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness, through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, 2016. "Ostracism and Forgiveness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2329-2348, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:8:p:2329-48
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130768
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Radost Holler & Paul Ivo Schäfer, 2021. "Norm Prevalence and Interdependence: Evidence from a Large-Scale Historical Survey of German speaking Villages," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 118, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    2. Fernando Vega-Redondo & Paolo Pin & Diego Ubfal & Cristiana Benedetti-Fasil & Charles Brummitt & Gaia Rubera & Dirk Hovy & Tommaso Fornaciari, 2019. "Peer Networks and Entrepreneurship: a Pan-African RCT," Working Papers 648, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. DeAngelo, Gregory & Humphreys, Brad R. & Reimers, Imke, 2017. "Are public and private enforcement complements or substitutes? Evidence from high frequency data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 151-163.
    4. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Lau, C. Oscar, 2017. "Soft transactions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 122-134.
    5. Carlos A. Chávez & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2021. "Co-enforcement of Common Pool Resources to Deter Encroachment: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Chile," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(2), pages 425-450, October.
    6. Ambrus, A. & Elliott, M., 2020. "Investments in Social Ties, Risk Sharing and Inequality," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2071, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Murphy, David M.A., 2023. "Sobriety, social capital, and village network structures," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    8. Muscillo, Alessio & Pin, Paolo & Razzolini, Tiziano & Serti, Francesco, 2018. "Does "Network Closure" Beef up Import Premium?," IZA Discussion Papers 12036, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, 2020. "Communication and Cooperation in Markets," Papers 2005.09839, arXiv.org.
    10. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers," Working Papers 17-21R2, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 05 Dec 2024.
    11. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L., 2019. "Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 169-176.
    12. Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo & Paola Rossi, 2018. "Debt restructuring with multiple bank relationships," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1191, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    13. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers & Yves Zenou, 2017. "The Economic Consequences of Social-Network Structure," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 49-95, March.
    14. Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2020. "Sanctions in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    15. Blumenstock, Joshua & Chi, Guanghua & Tan, Xu, 2019. "Migration and the Value of Social Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13611, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. David Jimenez-Gomez, 2021. "Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, January.
    17. Ruiz-Palazuelos, Sofía & Espinosa, María Paz & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2023. "The weakness of common job contacts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    18. Toygar T. Kerman & Anastas P. Tenev, 2024. "Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp772, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    19. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
    20. Polanski, Arnold, 2024. "Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    21. Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
    22. Leduc, Mathieu V., 2024. "Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 27-53.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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