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Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain

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  • Daniel Smith

Abstract

During a time when religious animosities were reaching their peak in Medieval Europe leading up to the violent crusades, Christians, Jews, and Muslims residing in close proximity in Medieval Spain experienced a period of relative peace, prosperity, and cultural exchange. This historical episode, referred to as La Convivencia, or the coexistence, is a puzzle to many period historians. This paper argues that this anomalistic period arose due to the emergence of commerce, which generated cooperation and mitigated conflict among these heterogeneous groups, à la the Doux-Commerce Thesis of the Scottish Enlightenment. Commercial exchange between Christians, Jews, and Muslims was established through the use of safe-conducts, a promise of protection sold to foreign merchants. This paper details the operation of safe-conducts and the civilizing role that commerce played among Christians, Jews, and Muslims in Medieval Spain. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • Daniel Smith, 2014. "Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 183-197, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:27:y:2014:i:2:p:183-197
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-014-0251-2
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    3. David J. Hebert & Richard E. Wagner, 2015. "Political Parties as Interest Groups," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001246, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Violence; Social distance; Institutions; Doux-Commerce Thesis; K40; P48;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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