IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbrese/v67y2014i8p1771-1779.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are two interviewers better than one?

Author

Listed:
  • Fifić, Mario
  • Gigerenzer, Gerd

Abstract

How many interviewers per job applicant are necessary for a company to achieve the highest hit rate? Are two better than one? Condorcet's Jury Theorem and the “wisdom of the crowd” suggest that more is better. Under quite general conditions this study shows, surprisingly, that two interviewers are on average not superior to the best interviewer. Adding further interviewers will also not increase the expected collective hit rate when interviewers are homogeneous (i.e., their hits are nested), only doing so when interviewers are heterogeneous (i.e., their hits are not nested). The current study shows how these results depend on the number of interviewers, their expertise, and the chance of free riding, and specify the conditions when “less is more”. This analysis suggests that the best policy is to invest resources into improving the quality of the best interviewer rather than distribute these to improve the quality of many interviewers.

Suggested Citation

  • Fifić, Mario & Gigerenzer, Gerd, 2014. "Are two interviewers better than one?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(8), pages 1771-1779.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:67:y:2014:i:8:p:1771-1779
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.03.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296314001003
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.03.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    2. Ariely, Dan & Levav, Jonathan, 2000. "Sequential Choice in Group Settings: Taking the Road Less Traveled and Less Enjoyed," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 27(3), pages 279-290, December.
    3. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
    4. Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    7. Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush, 2003. "Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 429-441, June.
    8. Robert L. Winkler & Roy M. Poses, 1993. "Evaluating and Combining Physicians' Probabilities of Survival in an Intensive Care Unit," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(12), pages 1526-1543, December.
    9. John P. Lightle & John H. Kagel & Hal R. Arkes, 2009. "Information Exchange in Group Decision Making: The Hidden Profile Problem Reconsidered," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(4), pages 568-581, April.
    10. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    11. Clemen, Robert T., 1989. "Combining forecasts: A review and annotated bibliography," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 559-583.
    12. Graham, John R, 1996. "Is a Group of Economists Better than One? Than None?," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(2), pages 193-232, April.
    13. Robert L. Winkler & Robert T. Clemen, 2004. "Multiple Experts vs. Multiple Methods: Combining Correlation Assessments," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 1(3), pages 167-176, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. von der Gracht, Heiko A. & Hommel, Ulrich & Prokesch, Tobias & Wohlenberg, Holger, 2016. "Testing weighting approaches for forecasting in a Group Wisdom Support System environment," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(10), pages 4081-4094.
    2. Petropoulos, Fotios & Apiletti, Daniele & Assimakopoulos, Vassilios & Babai, Mohamed Zied & Barrow, Devon K. & Ben Taieb, Souhaib & Bergmeir, Christoph & Bessa, Ricardo J. & Bijak, Jakub & Boylan, Joh, 2022. "Forecasting: theory and practice," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 705-871.
      • Fotios Petropoulos & Daniele Apiletti & Vassilios Assimakopoulos & Mohamed Zied Babai & Devon K. Barrow & Souhaib Ben Taieb & Christoph Bergmeir & Ricardo J. Bessa & Jakub Bijak & John E. Boylan & Jet, 2020. "Forecasting: theory and practice," Papers 2012.03854, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    3. Thomson, Mary E. & Pollock, Andrew C. & Önkal, Dilek & Gönül, M. Sinan, 2019. "Combining forecasts: Performance and coherence," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 474-484.
    4. De Baets, Shari & Harvey, Nigel, 2020. "Using judgment to select and adjust forecasts from statistical models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 284(3), pages 882-895.
    5. Reza Kheirandish & Shabnam Mousavi, 2018. "Herbert Simon, innovation, and heuristics," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 17(1), pages 97-109, November.
    6. Loock, Moritz & Hinnen, Gieri, 2015. "Heuristics in organizations: A review and a research agenda," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(9), pages 2027-2036.
    7. Deriu, Valerio & Pozharliev, Rumen & De Angelis, Matteo, 2024. "How trust and attachment styles jointly shape job candidates’ AI receptivity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Predicting Committee Action," Working Papers 050621, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    2. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, August.
    3. Hahn, Volker, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
    5. Ronen Bar-El & Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2021. "A Talmudic constrained voting majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 465-491, December.
    6. Jun Chen, 2021. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-33, October.
    7. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, August.
    8. Sapir, Luba, 2005. "Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 83-101, July.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:25:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Mor Zahavi, 2011. "The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 435-443, September.
    11. Großer, Jens & Seebauer, Michael, 2016. "The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 205-226.
    12. Matteo Triossiv, 2010. "Costly information acquisition. Better to toss a coin?," Documentos de Trabajo 267, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    13. Grant, Andrew & Johnstone, David, 2010. "Finding profitable forecast combinations using probability scoring rules," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 498-510, July.
    14. Volker Hahn, 2017. "On the drawbacks of large committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 563-582, May.
    15. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
    16. Keiichi Morimoto, 2021. "Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-22, May.
    17. Robbett, Andrea & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2018. "Partisan bias and expressive voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 107-120.
    18. Lahiri, Kajal & Yang, Liu, 2013. "Forecasting Binary Outcomes," Handbook of Economic Forecasting, in: G. Elliott & C. Granger & A. Timmermann (ed.), Handbook of Economic Forecasting, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1025-1106, Elsevier.
    19. Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 113-130, January.
    20. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    21. Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2014. "Voting in small committees," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 69-95, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:67:y:2014:i:8:p:1771-1779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.