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Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size

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  • Sapir, Luba

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  • Sapir, Luba, 2005. "Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 83-101, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:83-101
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    1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    2. Berg, Sven, 1993. "Condorcet's jury theorem revisited," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 437-446, August.
    3. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    4. Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush, 2003. "Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 429-441, June.
    5. Urken, Arnold B, 1991. "The Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social Choice Theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 213-236, December.
    6. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
    7. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush, 2000. "A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 189-199.
    8. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
    9. Kanazawa, Satoshi, 1998. "A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for heterogeneous groups," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 69-73, January.
    10. Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
    11. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-297, June.
    12. Luba Sapir, 1998. "The Optimality of the Expert and Majority Rules Under Exponentially Distributed Competence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 19-36, August.
    13. Ladha, Krishna K., 1995. "Information pooling through majority-rule voting: Condorcet's jury theorem with correlated votes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 353-372, May.
    14. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1984. "The accuracy of group majority decisions in groups with added members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 273-285, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Malik Magdon-Ismail & Lirong Xia, 2018. "A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy," Papers 1807.06157, arXiv.org.

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