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Labor market and access to justice

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  • Espinosa, Romain
  • Desrieux, Claudine
  • Ferracci, Marc

Abstract

In 2008, the French government enacted a reform that reduced the number of labor courts by one quarter. This led to significant changes in access to labor courts for many workers and employers who had to travel further to proceed with conflict litigation. We use this reform to evaluate how access to labor courts affects the labor market. Our empirical approach mainly relies on regression-adjusted conditional differences-in-differences estimations. We find that cities that experienced an increase in the distance to their associated labor court suffered from a lower growth rate of job creation (−4 percentage points), job destruction (−4.6 pp) and firm creation (−6.3 pp) between 2007 and 2012 compared to unaffected cities. We find opposite but insignificant effects for cities that experienced a fall in the distance to the labor court. These results emphasize the central role of labor courts for the good functioning of the labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Espinosa, Romain & Desrieux, Claudine & Ferracci, Marc, 2018. "Labor market and access to justice," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 1-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:1-16
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2017.09.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa, 2019. "Case selection and judicial decision-making: evidence from French labor courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 57-88, February.
    2. Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa, 2020. "Scale for capped damages in case of unfair dismissal: some empirical evidence [La Barémisation des indemnités pour licenciement abusif: Quelques Eléments d'Analyse Empirique]," Post-Print halshs-02307212, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Job creation; Job destruction; Firm creation; Labor courts; Judicial reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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