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Sequencing strategically: wage negotiations under oligopoly

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  • Banerji, A.

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  • Banerji, A., 2002. "Sequencing strategically: wage negotiations under oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1037-1058, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:7:p:1037-1058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
    3. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
    4. Dixon, Huw David, 1988. "Unions, Oligopoly and the Natural Range of Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1127-1147, December.
    5. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-569, May.
    6. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
    7. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    8. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Staggered vs. synchronised wage setting in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1507-1522, December.
    9. Byoung Heon Jun, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76.
    10. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Chica Páez, Yolanda & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2009. "Endogenous Unions Formation," DFAEII Working Papers 1988-088X, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    3. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
    4. repec:wsr:wpaper:y:2011:i:061 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Clark, Derek J. & Pereau, Jean Christophe, 2009. "Fragmented property rights and royalty bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 546-553, October.
    6. Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August.
    7. Liang Guo & Ganesh Iyer, 2013. "Multilateral Bargaining and Downstream Competition," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 411-430, May.
    8. Domenico Buccella, 2013. "Unions' bargaining coordination in multi-unit firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 217-225.
    9. Caparrós, By Alejandro & Pereau, Jean-Christophe, 2021. "Inefficient coasean negotiations over emissions and transfers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 359-378.
    10. Chica Páez, Yolanda & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2005. "Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market," DFAEII Working Papers 1988-088X, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    11. Domenico Buccella, 2013. "Unions’ bargaining coordination in multinational enterprises," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 373-392, November.
    12. António Brandão & Joana Pinho, 2018. "Productivity Shocks in a Union‐Duopoly Model," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 86(6), pages 722-756, December.

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