On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
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- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 181-199, October.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print halshs-00971403, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01044870, HAL.
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"Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions,"
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hal-00975533, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions," Post-Print hal-00975533, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015.
"Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1744-1751.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01241273, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01241273, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print hal-01241273, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014.
"Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
14072, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01112402, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining," Post-Print halshs-01112402, HAL.
- repec:hal:pseose:hal-01241273 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014.
"Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time,"
Post-Print
halshs-01113240, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01113240, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Union; firm bargaining; varying discount rates; subgame perfect equilibrium; equilibrium payoffs; Négociation entre un syndicat et une firme; taux d'escompte variable; équilibre en sous-jeu parfait; paiements sur un équilibre;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2014-04-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-04-18 (Microeconomics)
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