Inefficient coasean negotiations over emissions and transfers
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.044
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- B.A. Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2021. "Inefficient coasean negotiations over emissions and transfers," Post-Print hal-03432922, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Alain‐Désiré Nimubona & Jean‐Christophe Pereau, 2022.
"Negotiating over payments for wetland ecosystem services,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1507-1538, August.
- Alain‐désiré Nimubona & Jean‐christophe Pereau, 2022. "Negotiating over payments for wetland ecosystem services," Post-Print hal-03773091, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Polluter; Victim; Alternating-offers model; Sequential bargaining; Inside option; Impasse point; Coase theorem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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