IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/iepoli/v10y1998i3p369-387.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A bargaining model of retransmission consent and must-carry rule

Author

Listed:
  • Chae, Suchan

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Chae, Suchan, 1998. "A bargaining model of retransmission consent and must-carry rule," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 369-387, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:10:y:1998:i:3:p:369-387
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-6245(98)00008-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    2. Chae, Suchan, 1992. "Bundling subscription TV channels : A case of natural bundling," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 213-230, June.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Claude Crampes & Abraham Hollander, 2008. "The regulation of audiovisual content: quotas and conflicting objectives," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 195-219, December.
    2. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2004. "Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 731-754, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joalland, Olivier & Pereau, Jean-Christophe & Rambonilaza, Tina, 2019. "Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 75-85.
    2. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    3. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-027 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Shady S. Atallah & Miguel I. Gómez & Jon M. Conrad, 2017. "Specification of Spatial-Dynamic Externalities and Implications for Strategic Behavior in Disease Control," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 93(2), pages 209-229.
    5. Lars Boerner & Daniel Quint, 2023. "Medieval Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(1), pages 23-56, February.
    6. John M. Crespi & Jennifer S. James, 2007. "Bargaining rationale for cooperative generic advertising," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 51(4), pages 445-457, December.
    7. Pang, Yu, 2019. "Taxing pollution and profits: A bargaining approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 278-288.
    8. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Institutional competition, political process and holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-027, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    9. Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2020. "Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1139-1172, August.
    10. Matsushima, Noriaki & Shinohara, Ryusuke, 2019. "Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 84-93.
    11. Carlton, Dennis W., 2020. "Transaction costs and competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    12. Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998. "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 647-675, October.
    13. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2022. "The Bargaining Trap," CESifo Working Paper Series 9903, CESifo.
    14. Krzysztof Pelc & Johannes Urpelainen, 2015. "When do international economic agreements allow countries to pay to breach?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 231-264, June.
    15. Matthew Backus & Tom Blake & Steven Tadelis, 2015. "Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation," NBER Working Papers 21285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2007. "The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-67, July.
    17. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, September.
    18. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2022. "(In)Efficient Bargaining in the Family," Working Papers 2, SITES.
    19. Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2022. "The bargaining trap," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 249-254.
    20. Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1989. "Studying Institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(2), pages 131-147, April.
    21. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:10:y:1998:i:3:p:369-387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.