IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v34y2008i3p195-219.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The regulation of audiovisual content: quotas and conflicting objectives

Author

Listed:
  • Claude Crampes
  • Abraham Hollander

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Crampes & Abraham Hollander, 2008. "The regulation of audiovisual content: quotas and conflicting objectives," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 195-219, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:195-219
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-008-9068-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-008-9068-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11149-008-9068-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin Richardson, 2004. "Cultural quotas in broadcasting II: policy," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2004-443, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    2. Martin Richardson, 2004. "Cultural quotas in broadcasting I: a model," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2004-442, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    3. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    4. Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham, 2005. "Product specification, multi-product screening and bundling: the case of pay TV," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 35-59, January.
    5. Vita, Michael G, 1997. "Must Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 159-172, September.
    6. Allan Brown & Martin Cave, 1992. "The Economics of Television Regulation: A Survey with Application to Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 68(4), pages 377-394, December.
    7. repec:bla:ecorec:v:68:y:1992:i:203:p:377-94 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Hansen, Claus Thustrup & Kyhl, Soren, 2001. "Pay-per-view broadcasting of outstanding events: consequences of a ban," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 589-609, March.
    9. Corts, Kenneth S, 1995. "Regulation of a Multi-product Monopolist: Effects on Pricing and Bundling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 377-397, December.
    10. Chae, Suchan, 1998. "A bargaining model of retransmission consent and must-carry rule," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 369-387, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin Richardson & Simon Wilkie, 2013. "Faddists, enthusiasts and Canadian divas:a model of the recorded music market," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-600, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    2. Martin Richardson, 2004. "Cultural quotas in broadcasting II: policy," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2004-443, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nela Filimon & Jordi López-Sintas & Carlos Padrós-Reig, 2011. "A test of Rosen’s and Adler’s theories of superstars," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 35(2), pages 137-161, May.
    2. Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, 2005. "Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(4), pages 947-972.
    3. Anderson, Simon P. & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 2006. "The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, in: V.A. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 567-614, Elsevier.
    4. Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham, 2005. "Product specification, multi-product screening and bundling: the case of pay TV," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 35-59, January.
    5. Chenghuan Sean Chu, 2008. "The effect of satellite entry on product quality for cable television," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-12, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Perona, Mathieu, 2010. "How Broadcasting Quotas Harm Program Diversity," MPRA Paper 19860, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Nuño Ledesma José G. & Wu Steven Y. & Balagtas Joseph V., 2022. "Nonlinear Pricing Under Regulation: Comparing Cap Rules and Taxes in the Laboratory," Working Papers 2022-10, Banco de México.
    8. Julie Holland Mortimer, 2007. "Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 1307-1350.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2553-2595, August.
    10. Ionela Munteanu & Adriana Grigorescu & Elena Condrea & Elena Pelinescu, 2020. "Convergent Insights for Sustainable Development and Ethical Cohesion: An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Romanian Public Entities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-17, April.
    11. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Nahata, Babu & Ringbom, Staffan, 2007. "Price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 267-271, May.
    13. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2011. "How optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1239-1247.
    14. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597, September.
    15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
    16. Ying-Ju Chen, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Display Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 897-913, August.
    17. Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2016. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 189-222, August.
    18. Tian Xia & Richard Sexton, 2010. "Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(4), pages 333-349, June.
    19. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2012. "Signing distortions in optimal tax or other adverse selection models with random participation," THEMA Working Papers 2012-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    20. Schlereth, Christian & Stepanchuk, Tanja & Skiera, Bernd, 2010. "Optimization and analysis of the profitability of tariff structures with two-part tariffs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 206(3), pages 691-701, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Television; Audiovisual; Content regulation; Bundling; Quota; L12; L15; L82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:195-219. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.