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Studying Institutions

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  • Kenneth A. Shepsle

Abstract

This article examines recent developments in a literature referred to as `the new institutionalism'. After reviewing some of the consequences for the study of institutions of the behavioral revolution and the elaboration of Arrovian theories of social choice, the author develops the theory of structure-induced equilibrium and explores the two sides of the institutional coin - an examination of the consequences of institutional structure and an explanation of the development of institutional structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1989. "Studying Institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(2), pages 131-147, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:131-147
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001002002
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