Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
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- Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva, 2004. "Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, May.
- Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
- Igal Milchtaich, 2005. "Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 225-244, February.
- Holzman, Ron & Law-yone (Lev-tov), Nissan, 2003. "Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 193-205, October.
- Milchtaich, Igal, 2006. "Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 321-346, November.
- Richard Steinberg & Willard I. Zangwill, 1983. "The Prevalence of Braess' Paradox," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 301-318, August.
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Cited by:
- Satoru Fujishige & Michel X. Goemans & Tobias Harks & Britta Peis & Rico Zenklusen, 2017. "Matroids Are Immune to Braess’ Paradox," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(3), pages 745-761, August.
- T. Werth & H. Sperber & S. Krumke, 2014. "Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(4), pages 687-712, December.
- Andrzej Grzybowski, 2009. "A Note On A Single Vehicle And One Destination Routing Problem And Its Game-Theoretic Models," Advanced Logistic systems, University of Miskolc, Department of Material Handling and Logistics, vol. 3(1), pages 71-76, December.
- Thanasis Lianeas & Evdokia Nikolova & Nicolas E. Stier-Moses, 2019. "Risk-Averse Selfish Routing," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 38-57, February.
- Wang, Aihu & Tang, Yuanhua & Mohmand, Yasir Tariq & Xu, Pei, 2022. "Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess Paradox considering elastic demand," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 605(C).
- Xujin Chen & Zhuo Diao & Xiaodong Hu, 2022. "On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1705-1723, October.
- Xujin Chen & Zhuo Diao & Xiaodong Hu, 0. "On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-19.
- Igal Milchtaich, 2021. "Internalization of social cost in congestion games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 717-760, March.
- Leah Epstein & Sven O. Krumke & Asaf Levin & Heike Sperber, 2011. "Selfish bin coloring," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 531-548, November.
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Keywords
Network routing games Congestion games Price of anarchy;Statistics
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