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Trees and decisions

Author

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  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer
  • Klaus Ritzberger

Abstract

The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory perceives of acts as functions from states to consequences. Sequential decisions, accordingly, get conceptualized by mappings from sets of states to sets of consequences. Thus, the question arises whether a natural definition of a tree can be given, where nodes are sets of states. We show that, indeed, trees can be defined as specific collections of sets. Without loss of generality the elements of these sets can be interpreted as representing plays. Therefore, the elements can serve as states and consequences at the same time. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2005. "Trees and decisions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(4), pages 763-798, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:4:p:763-798
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0487-3
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter A. Streufert, 2015. "Specifying Nodes as Sets of Choices," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20151, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    3. Shravan Luckraz, 2019. "A Survey on the Relationship Between the Game of Cops and Robbers and Other Game Representations," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 506-520, June.
    4. Peter A. Streufert, 2015. "Choice-Set Forms are Dual to Outcome-Set Forms," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20153, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    5. J. Jude Kline & Shravan Luckraz, 2016. "Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 85-94, April.
    6. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
    7. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2008. "Trees and extensive forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 216-250, November.
    8. Peter A. Streufert, 2015. "Concisely Specifying Choices in an Outcome-Set Form," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20152, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    9. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 407-430, February.
    10. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 19-29.
    11. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizations of perfect recall," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 311-326, May.
    12. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kern, Johannes, 2015. "Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 34-57.
    13. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2016. "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 5-18.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Extensive form games; Sequential decisions; Trees.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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