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Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Top Trading Cycles

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  • Peter Troyan

Abstract

Although there is a rich theoretical literature extolling the virtues of the top trading cycles (TTCs) mechanism, it is rarely used in practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that one possible explanation is that TTC is difficult for participants to understand. This article formalizes this intuition by asking whether it is possible to implement TTC in an obviously strategy‐proof (OSP) way. I identify an acyclicity condition that is both necessary and sufficient for OSP implementation of TTC. The condition is unlikely to hold in most applications, which may explain why TTC is rarely used, despite its many appealing theoretical properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Troyan, 2019. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Top Trading Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1249-1261, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:3:p:1249-1261
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12384
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    Cited by:

    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    3. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2023. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 293, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    4. Markus Möller, 2024. "Transparent Matching Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 306, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Pinaki Mandal & Souvik Roy, 2022. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 261-290, February.
    6. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    7. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    8. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    9. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    10. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    12. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
    13. Kumar, Rajnish & Manocha, Kriti & Ortega, Josué, 2022. "On the integration of Shapley–Scarf markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    14. Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    15. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.

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