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Does powerful executive holding a dual post as the board secretary reduce nonpunitive regulation?

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  • Huang, Huiqin
  • Wang, Chenglong
  • Yu, Wei
  • Zhu, Keying

Abstract

To test whether powerful executives serving concurrently as board secretary can influence nonpunitive administrative supervision, this paper employs a sample of 2014–2020 Chinese A-share listed companies for empirical analysis. Results show that firms with powerful executives serving concurrently as the board secretary are more likely to be questioned by the Exchanges. The mechanism test shows that powerful executives serving concurrently as the secretary can increase agency costs and reduce information quality. Further findings illustrate that for companies with powerful executives holding a dual post, the issues mentioned in the comment letters are more serious, and the probability of a late reply is higher. Moreover, the concurrent appointment of the vice president or director is more likely to cause the company to be questioned, while this is not the case for the CFO. This paper shed new insights on the evaluation of the economic consequences of the powerful executives holding a dual post as the board secretary based on comment letter data.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Huiqin & Wang, Chenglong & Yu, Wei & Zhu, Keying, 2023. "Does powerful executive holding a dual post as the board secretary reduce nonpunitive regulation?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:89:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923003137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102797
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comment letter; Agency cost; Dual post;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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