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Patrolling a perimeter

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  • Zoroa, N.
  • Fernández-Sáez, M.J.
  • Zoroa, P.

Abstract

In this paper we study the problem of patrolling a perimeter. The general situation considered here can correspond to different tactical problems and it is studied from the point of view of game theory. To put the ideas in a context we describe it as follows. An intruder seeks to carry out a sabotage on the perimeter of a protected zone. He has to perform the action along n consecutive days and has to position himself each day at one of m strategic points placed on this border. The first day he can take his place at any of the m points, but on successive days he can move only to adjacent points. Furthermore, the perimeter is protected by a patroller, who will select each day one of the m points to inspect. The strategic situation is modeled as a two-person zero-sum game, which is developed on a cyclic set of m points over n time units. We prove some interesting properties of the strategies, solve the game in closed form under certain constraints and obtain bounds for the value of the game in several non-solved cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Zoroa, N. & Fernández-Sáez, M.J. & Zoroa, P., 2012. "Patrolling a perimeter," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(3), pages 571-582.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:222:y:2012:i:3:p:571-582
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.030
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    Cited by:

    1. Bui, Thuy & Lidbetter, Thomas, 2023. "Optimal patrolling strategies for trees and complete networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 769-776.
    2. Garrec, Tristan, 2019. "Continuous patrolling and hiding games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 277(1), pages 42-51.
    3. Karwowski, Jan & Mańdziuk, Jacek, 2019. "A Monte Carlo Tree Search approach to finding efficient patrolling schemes on graphs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 277(1), pages 255-268.
    4. Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
    5. Ríos Insua, David & Cano, Javier & Pellot, Michael & Ortega, Ricardo, 2016. "Multithreat multisite protection: A security case study," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(3), pages 888-899.
    6. Lidbetter, Thomas, 2017. "On the approximation ratio of the Random Chinese Postman Tour for network search," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 263(3), pages 782-788.
    7. Camacho-Collados, M. & Liberatore, F. & Angulo, J.M., 2015. "A multi-criteria Police Districting Problem for the efficient and effective design of patrol sector," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(2), pages 674-684.
    8. Alpern, Steve & Lidbetter, Thomas & Papadaki, Katerina, 2019. "Optimizing periodic patrols against short attacks on the line and other networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1065-1073.
    9. Alpern, Steve & Fokkink, Robbert & Simanjuntak, Martin, 2016. "Optimal search and ambush for a hider who can escape the search region," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(3), pages 707-714.
    10. G. Quijano, Eduardo & Ríos Insua, David & Cano, Javier, 2018. "Critical networked infrastructure protection from adversaries," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 27-36.
    11. Collado, Ricardo & Meisel, Stephan & Priekule, Laura, 2017. "Risk-averse stochastic path detection," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 195-211.
    12. Oléron Evans, Thomas P. & Bishop, Steven R., 2013. "Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 231(3), pages 667-689.

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