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It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust

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  • Bigoni, Maria
  • Bortolotti, Stefania
  • Casari, Marco
  • Gambetta, Diego

Abstract

Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust decisions involve multiple agents. Of particular interest is the case when a breach of trust is not profitable if carried out in isolation, but requires an agreement among agents. In such situations the pattern of behaviors is richer than in dyadic games, because even opportunistic trustees who would breach trust when alone may act trustworthily based on what they believe to be the predominant course of action. Anticipating this, trusters may be more inclined to trust. We dub these motivations derived trustworthiness and derived trust. To capture them, we design a “Collective Trust Game” and study it by means of a laboratory experiment. We report that overall levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when derived motivations are present, and this generates also higher levels of trust. In our set-up, the effects of derived trustworthiness are comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.

Suggested Citation

  • Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Casari, Marco & Gambetta, Diego, 2013. "It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 129-146.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:64:y:2013:i:c:p:129-146
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.08.009
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    Cited by:

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    2. Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015. "Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
    3. Tagat, Anirudh & Kapoor, Hansika, 2017. "The trust broker game: A three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry," Economics Discussion Papers 2017-33, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Cicognani, Simona & Romagnoli, Giorgia & Soraperra, Ivan, 2024. "Fostering trust: When the rhetoric of sharing can backfire," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
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    6. Banuri’s, Sheheryar & de Oliveira, Angela C.M. & Eckel, Catherine C., 2019. "Care provision: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 615-630.
    7. Bryan C. McCannon & Colleen Tokar Asaad & Mark Wilson, 2015. "Contracts and Trust," Working Papers 15-15, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trust game; Coordination; Inequality aversion; Reciprocity; Collective trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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