The self-reinforcing nature of crime
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yamamura, Eiji, 2009. "Formal and informal deterrents of crime in Japan: Roles of police and social capital revisited," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 611-621, August.
- Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves & Lee, Lung-Fei, 2011.
"Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?,"
Research Papers in Economics
2011:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves & Lee, Lung-Fei, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 128707, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Xiaodong Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou & Lung-Fei Lee, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Working Papers 2012.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Zenou, Yves & , & Patacchini, Eleonora & Liu, Xiaodong, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Zenou, Yves & , & Patacchini, Eleonora & Liu, Xiaodong, 2011. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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"Homophily, peer effects and dishonesty,"
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- Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 21011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03196953, HAL.
- Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty," Working Papers 2107, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty," Working Papers halshs-03187671, HAL.
- Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty," Post-Print halshs-03196953, HAL.
- Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty," CIRANO Working Papers 2021s-16, CIRANO.
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"Status concerns as a motive for crime?,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 46-55.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Status Concerns as a Motive for Crime?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4225, CESifo.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Status concerns as a motive for crime?," DICE Discussion Papers 93, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Ufere, Nnaoke & Perelli, Sheri & Boland, Richard & Carlsson, Bo, 2012. "Merchants of Corruption: How Entrepreneurs Manufacture and Supply Bribes," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2440-2453.
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"Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
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- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nathan Berg & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2015.
"Quantity Restrictions with Imperfect Enforcement in an Overused Commons: Permissive Regulation to Reduce Overuse?,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(2), pages 308-329, June.
- Jeong-Yoo Kim & Nathan Berg, 2014. ": Quantity restrictions with imperfect enforcement in an over-used commons: Permissive regulation to reduce over-use?," Working Papers 1406, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised May 2014.
- Brendan O'Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, 2010. "Peaceable Kingdoms and War Zones: Preemption, Ballistics and Murder in Newark," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Crime: Lessons For and From Latin America, pages 305-353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
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- O’Flaherty, Brendan & Sethi, Rajiv, 2015. "Urban Crime," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1519-1621, Elsevier.
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