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The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement

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  • Steffen Huck
  • Michael Kosfeld

Abstract

We propose a dynamic model of neighbourhood watch schemes. While the state chooses punishment levels, apprehension of criminals depends on the watchfulness of citizens. We show that, contrary to standard intuition, crime levels can increase in punishments. This is because neighbourhood watch schemes can fall victim to their own success if recruitment of new members is driven by fear of crime - a finding that is in line with the empirical literature. We discuss the policy implications of this result and show how it extends to the more general problem of norm enforcement among interacting citizens. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Huck & Michael Kosfeld, 2007. "The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 270-286, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:117:y:2007:i:516:p:270-286
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    1. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 973-997.
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    5. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "The demand for punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 522-542, April.
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    7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2002. "Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 415(6868), pages 137-140, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yamamura, Eiji, 2009. "Formal and informal deterrents of crime in Japan: Roles of police and social capital revisited," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 611-621, August.
    2. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "The effects of the social norm on cigarette consumption: Evidence from Japan using panel data," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 6-12, January.
    3. Gonzalo Olcina & Vicente Calabuig, 2015. "Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 147-173, April.
    4. Eiji Yamamura, 2016. "Effects of Female Labor Participation on Smoking Behavior in Japan: Selection Model Approach," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 59(3), pages 1-18.
    5. Akçomak, İ. Semih & ter Weel, Bas, 2012. "The impact of social capital on crime: Evidence from the Netherlands," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 323-340.
    6. Ferrer, Rosa, 2010. "Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 163-180, February.
    7. Simundza, Daniel, 2014. "Criminal registries, community notification, and optimal avoidance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 73-82.
    8. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, 2007. "Calculating Tragedy: Assessing The Costs Of Terrorism," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 1-24, February.
    9. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "Comparison of the effects of homeownership by individuals and their neighbors on social capital formation: Evidence from Japanese General Social Surveys," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 637-644.
    10. Remenik, Daniel, 2009. "Limit theorems for individual-based models in economics and finance," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 119(8), pages 2401-2435, August.
    11. Josef Falkinger, 2004. "Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series 1368, CESifo.
    12. Yamamura, Eiji, 2010. "Effects of Female Labor Participation and Marital Status on Smoking Behavior in Japan," MPRA Paper 21789, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Feess, Eberhard & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2018. "The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 58-73.
    14. Olcina, Gonzalo & Calabuig, Vicente, 2021. "Trust and punishment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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