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A bargaining model of financial intermediation

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  • Bester, Helmut

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  • Bester, Helmut, 1995. "A bargaining model of financial intermediation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 211-228, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:2:p:211-228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gehrig, Thomas, 1993. "Intermediation in Search Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, Spring.
    2. Helmut Bester, 1988. "Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(2), pages 201-214.
    3. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1987. "Middlemen," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(3), pages 581-593.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    5. Stahl, Dale O, II, 1988. "Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 189-201, March.
    6. Yanelle, Marie-Odile, 1989. "The strategic analysis of intermediation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 294-301, March.
    7. Ken Binmore & Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 753-770.
    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bester, Helmut & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2001. "Delegated bargaining and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 459-473, August.
    2. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2002. "Equilibrium Unemployment and Credit Market Imperfections: The Critical Role of Labour Mobility," CESifo Working Paper Series 654, CESifo.
    3. Chae, Suchan & Song, Jaehee, 2017. "Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 63-72.
    4. Dorothea Schäfer, 2001. "Outside Collateral, Preserving The Value Of Inside Collateral And Sorting," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 53(4), pages 321-350, October.
    5. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2004. "Agency Cost of Debt and Credit Market Imperfections: A Bargaining Approach," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 365-377, October.
    6. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2009. "The Role of Financial Intermediaries in Securities Issues: A Theoretical Analysis," MPRA Paper 16112, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Kutsoati, Edward, 2007. "(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 754-767, September.
    8. Scheepens, J.P.J.F., 1994. "Financial intermediations, bank failure and official assistance," Other publications TiSEM 3519e91e-2830-489e-befa-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Scheepens, J.P.J.F., 1994. "Financial intermediations, bank failure and official assistance," Discussion Paper 1994-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2004. "Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 677-701, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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