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Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default

Author

Listed:
  • Frederique Bracoud

    (Keele University)

Abstract

This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederique Bracoud, 2007. "Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(7), pages 1-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05d40005
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frédérique Bracoud, 2002. "Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information 0211002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Stahl, Dale O, II, 1988. "Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 189-201, March.
    3. Yanelle, Marie-Odile, 1989. "The strategic analysis of intermediation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 294-301, March.
    4. Linda Toolsema, 2001. "Reserve requirements and double Bertrand competition among banks," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(5), pages 291-293.
    5. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, April.
    6. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Ruiz - Porras, 2008. "Los beneficios del liderazgo en el mercado de depositos bancarios: Una comparacion entre Cournot y Stackelberg," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 4(2), pages 79-105, Enero-Jun.
    2. Biancini, Sara & Verdier, Marianne, 2023. "Bank-platform competition in the credit market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    3. Marcello Pagnini & Paola Rossi & Valerio Vacca & Michael Sigmund & Ulrich Gunter & Gerald Krenn, 2017. "How Do Macroeconomic and Bank-specific Variables Influence Profitability in the Austrian Banking Sector? Evidence from a Panel Vector Autoregression Analysis," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 46(3), pages 555-586, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bertrand Competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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