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Dissonance Minimization and Conversation in Social Networks

Author

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  • Mikhail Anufriev
  • Kirill Borissov
  • Mikhail Pakhnin

Abstract

We study a model of social learning in networks where the dynamics of beliefs are driven by conversations of dissonance-minimizing agents. Given their current beliefs, agents make statements, tune them to the statements of their associates, and then revise their beliefs. We characterize the long-run beliefs in a society, provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a society to reach a consensus, and show that agents’ social influences (weights on the consensus belief) are decreasing in their dissonance sensitivities. Comparing the outcomes of two models, with and without conversation, we show that conversation leads to a redistribution of social influences in favor of agents with higher self-confidence. Finally, we provide analytical insights for the model where agents minimize dissonance by revising both beliefs and network, and show that an endogenous change of network may prevent a society from reaching a consensus.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Anufriev & Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2021. "Dissonance Minimization and Conversation in Social Networks," CESifo Working Paper Series 9433, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9433
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    Cited by:

    1. Ugo Bolletta & Paolo Pin, 2024. "Dynamic opinion updating with endogenous networks," Papers 2405.01341, arXiv.org.
    2. Olcina, Gonzalo & Panebianco, Fabrizio & Zenou, Yves, 2024. "Conformism, social pressure, and the dynamics of integration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 279-304.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social networks; DeGroot learning; social influence; dissonance minimization; conversation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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