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A Single-Judge Solution to Beauty Contests

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  • Zhen Huo
  • Marcelo Pedroni

Abstract

We show that the equilibrium policy rule in beauty contest models is equivalent to that of a single agent's forecast of the economic fundamental. This forecast is conditional on a modified information process, which simply discounts the precision of idiosyncratic shocks by the degree of strategic complementarity. The result holds for any linear Gaussian signal process (static or persistent, stationary or nonstationary, exogenous or endogenous), and also extends to network games. Theoretically, this result provides a sharp characterization of the equilibrium and its properties under dynamic information. Practically, it provides a straightforward method to solve models with complicated information structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhen Huo & Marcelo Pedroni, 2020. "A Single-Judge Solution to Beauty Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(2), pages 526-568, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:2:p:526-68
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170519
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-588, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lerby Ergun & Andreas Uthemann, 2020. "Strategic Uncertainty in Financial Markets: Evidence from a Consensus Pricing Service," Staff Working Papers 20-55, Bank of Canada.
    2. Jonathan J Adams, 2023. "Equilibrium Determinacy With Behavioral Expectations," Working Papers 001008, University of Florida, Department of Economics.
    3. Artūras Juodis & Simas Kučinskas, 2023. "Quantifying noise in survey expectations," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), pages 609-650, May.
    4. Ou, Shengliang & Zhang, Donghai & Zhang, Renbin, 2021. "Information frictions, monetary policy, and the paradox of price flexibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 70-82.
    5. Huo, Zhen & Pedroni, Marcelo, 2023. "Dynamic information aggregation: Learning from the past," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 107-124.
    6. Flynn, Joel P. & Sastry, Karthik A., 2023. "Strategic mistakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    7. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Alessio Volpicella & Bo Yang, 2022. "The Use and Mis-Use of SVARs for Validating DSGE Models," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0522, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    8. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Stephen Wright & Bo Yang, 2023. "Imperfect Information and Hidden Dynamics," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1223, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    9. Yu-Ting Chiang, 2022. "Attention and Fluctuations in Macroeconomic Uncertainty," Working Papers 2022-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 09 Nov 2023.
    10. Ethan Struby & Christina Farhart, 2024. "Inflation Expectations and Political Polarization: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Study," Working Papers 2024-01, Carleton College, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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