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Debunking Rumors in Networks

Author

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  • Luca Paolo Merlino

    (Department of Economics University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium; ECARES Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)

  • Paolo Pin

    (Department of Economics University of Siena; BIDSA, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy)

  • Nicole Tabasso

    (Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice; School of Economics, University of Surrey)

Abstract

We study the diffusion of a true and a false opinion (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing an opinion, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Online social communication exacerbates relative rumor prevalence as long as it increases homophily or verification costs. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals' incentives to verify.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Paolo Merlino & Paolo Pin & Nicole Tabasso, 2019. "Debunking Rumors in Networks," Working Papers 2019: 29, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2019:29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tuval Danenberg & Drew Fudenberg, 2024. "Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News," Papers 2406.11024, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Networks; Rumors; Verification;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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