On the social efficiency of conflict
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- Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2005. "On the Social Efficiency of Conflict," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 97, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010.
"Peace agreements without commitment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2008. "Peace Agreements Without Commitment," Working Papers 340, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Beviá, Carmen, 2008. "Peace agreements without commitment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081508, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza & Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2018.
"Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?,"
Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 186-205.
- Markwardt, Gunther & Farzanegan, Mohammad & Leßmann, Christian, 2013. "Natural-resource rents and internal conflicts - Can decentralization lift the curse?," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79940, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Christian Lessmann & Gunther Markwardt, 2013. "Natural-Resource Rents and Internal Conflicts - Can Decentralization Lift the Curse?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4180, CESifo.
- Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2007.
"Endogenous coalition formation in contests,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 139-163, September.
- Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Janus, Thorsten, 2012. "Natural resource extraction and civil conflict," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 24-31.
- Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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