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Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions

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  • Santiago S?chez-Pag?

Abstract

This paper analyzes a model where groups can attain exclusive ownership of a resource by means of a contest. We show that more concave production technologies and more egalitarianism within groups induce higher levels of social conflict. We then study endogenous coalition formation. Under cooperative exploitation of the resource, the grand coalition is the efficient partition but there exists a strong tendency toward bipartisan conflicts. Under noncooperative exploitation, conflict can ex ante Pareto dominate peaceful access and it becomes more difficult to support the grand coalition as a stable structure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Santiago S?chez-Pag?, "undated". "Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 547.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:547.02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2004. "A model of the origins of basic property rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 288-312, November.
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    6. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    7. repec:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:2:p:247-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 1999. "The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 157-171.
    9. Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521560634, September.
    10. Holger Meinhardt, 1999. "Common Pool Games are Convex Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 247-270, April.
    11. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2015. "Endogenous group formation in experimental contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 163-189.
    2. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2020. "Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 891-927.
    3. Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
    4. Guofu Tan & Ruqu Wang, 2010. "Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 273-299, March.
    5. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan & Dimitar Simeonov, 2023. "Formation of Teams in Contests: Tradeoffs Between Inter and Intra-Team Inequalities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1061, Boston College Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition formation; exclusion contest; tragedy of the commons;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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