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Dynamic public goods provision with coalitional manipulation

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  • Chakravorti, Bhaskar

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  • Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1995. "Dynamic public goods provision with coalitional manipulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 143-161, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:56:y:1995:i:1:p:143-161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. E. Malinvaud, 1972. "Prices for Individual Consumption, Quantity Indicators for Collective Consumption," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 39(4), pages 385-405.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
    3. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1992. "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 101-121, January.
    4. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
    5. E. Malinvaud, 1971. "A Planning Approach to the Public Good Problem," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Peter Bohm & Allen V. Kneese (ed.), The Economics of Environment, pages 77-93, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
    7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    8. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1991. "Proportional division in a planning procedure," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 450-459, September.
    9. Truchon, Michel, 1984. "Nonmyopic Strategic Behavior in the MDP Planning Procedure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1179-1189, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kimitoshi Sato, 2016. "The MDP Procedure for public goods and local strategy proofness," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 5(1), pages 1-31, December.

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