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Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system

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  • Greenberg, Joseph

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  • Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:49:y:1989:i:1:p:195-202
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferreira, Jos e Luis, 1996. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 249-257, January.
    2. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Londregan, John & Rosenthal, Howard, 1993. "A Model of the Political Economy of the United States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 12-33, March.
    4. Inarra, E. & Larrea, C. & Saracho, A., 2010. "Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 141-147, March.
    5. repec:cte:derepe:3363 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    7. Takashi Kamihigashi & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2021. "Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 289-312, October.
    8. Daniel G. Arce M., 1996. "Social Norms, Inflation And Stabilization," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(3), pages 277-294, August.
    9. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers _001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics.
    10. Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society.
    11. Nicholas Ziros, 2011. "Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 14-2011, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    12. Alesina, A. & Rosenthal, H., 1989. "Moderating Elections," Working papers 537, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    13. Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
    14. Daniel G. Arce M., 1994. "Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(4), pages 749-765, December.
    15. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95.
    16. Daniel Arce, 2022. "Security-Induced Lock-In in the Cloud," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 64(4), pages 501-513, August.
    17. Austin, D. Andrew, 1995. "Coordinated action in local public goods models: The case of secession without exclusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 235-256, October.
    18. Inarra, Elena & Concepcion Larrea, M. & Saracho, Ana I., 2007. "The supercore for normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 530-538, January.
      • Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    19. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Mar 2008.
    20. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 2001. "Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 303-307, September.
    21. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    22. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2017. "The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 149-166, March.
    23. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1995. "Dynamic public goods provision with coalitional manipulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 143-161, January.

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