A "Coalition Proof" Equilibrium For A Private Information Credit Economy
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Other versions of this item:
- Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
- Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1990. "A \"coalition proof\" equilibrium for a private information credit economy," Working Paper 90-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Domeij, David & Ellingsen, Tore, 2015. "Rational Bubbles and Economic Crises: A Quantitative Analysis," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics 2015:1, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
- John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The adverse selection approach to financial intermediation: some characteristics of the equilibrium financial structure," Working Paper 95-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996.
"Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1717-1736, December.
- Asheim, G.B. & Nilssen, T., 1994. "Non-Discriminating Renegotiation in a Competitive Insurance Market," Papers 25, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
- Asheim, G.B. & Nilssen, T., 1995. "Non-Discriminating Renogociation in a Competitive Insurance Market," Memorandum 1995_003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- John A. Weinberg, 1995. "Cycles in lending standards?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 1-18.
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Keywords
capital ; investments ; entrepreneurs ; economic equilibrium ; resource allocation;All these keywords.
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