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Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness

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  • Bu, Nanyang

Abstract

We study the general problem of public choice. We consider environments where agents’ identities may not be observable. A “rule” associates a preference profile with an alternative. An agent may create fictitious identities and submit multiple preference relations under them. We study false-name-proofness, the requirement that no agent should ever gain via such operations. Our main result is that if a rule is anonymous, strategy-proof, and population monotonic, then it is false-name-proof; if the preference domain contains only strict preference relations, the converse also holds.

Suggested Citation

  • Bu, Nanyang, 2013. "Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 559-561.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:559-561
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
    2. Yokoo, Makoto & Sakurai, Yuko & Matsubara, Shigeo, 2004. "The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 174-188, January.
    3. William Thomson, 1983. "The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 319-326, August.
    4. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

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    2. Liu, Bo & Liu, Yang & Peng, Juan & Yang, Jinqiang, 2017. "Optimal capital structure and credit spread under incomplete information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 596-611.
    3. Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.
    4. Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01061994, HAL.
    5. Federico Fioravanti & Jordi Massó, 2024. "False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 391-408, September.
    6. Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," SciencePo Working papers hal-01061994, HAL.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Patrick Harless, 2015. "Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 97-121, June.
    10. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public choice; False-name-proofness; Anonymity; Strategy-proofness; Population monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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