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Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences

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  • Bettina Klaus
  • Panos Protopapas

Abstract

We consider the problem of choosing a set of locations of a public good on the real line R. Similarly to Klaus and Storcken (2002), we ordinally extend the agents' preferences over compact subsets of R, and extend the results of Ching and Thomson (1996), Vohra 1999), and Klaus (2001) to choice correspondences. Specifically, we show that efficiency}and either population-monotonicity or one-sided replacement-dominance characterize the class of target set correspondences on the domains of single-peaked preferences and symmetric single-peaked preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2017. "Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sidartha Gordon, 2007. "Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 125-147, July.
    2. Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May.
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    6. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 405-430, October.
    7. repec:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:167-84 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.
    9. Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170.
    10. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.
    11. Ehlers, Lars, 2003. "Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-27, April.
    12. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February.
    13. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    14. Harless, Patrick, 2015. "Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 81-86.
    15. Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
    16. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-184, April.
    17. BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2012. "Strategy-proof Preference Aggregation," Cahiers de recherche 2012-10, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    18. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
    19. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
    20. Patrick Harless, 2015. "Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 97-121, June.
    21. William Thomson, 1983. "The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 319-326, August.
    22. Harless, Patrick, 2016. "Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 73-87.
    23. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
    24. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2014. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 109-126.
    25. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 405-430, October.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1059-1080, December.
    3. Lars Ehlers, 2022. "Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 367-384, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    single-peaked preferences; population-monotonicity; replacement-dominance; target set correspondences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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