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A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

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  • Bandhu, Sarvesh
  • Lahiri, Abhinaba
  • Pramanik, Anup

Abstract

This paper characterizes status quo rules in the binary social choice environment. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. We show that status quo rules are the only rules that satisfy ontoness, strategy-proofness and a solidarity property. The solidarity property that we consider, positively correlates the welfare of a voter to rest of the voters in case of her improvement. It is independent from the usual solidarity axiom of welfare dominance under preference replacement used in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Bandhu, Sarvesh & Lahiri, Abhinaba & Pramanik, Anup, 2020. "A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301221
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109154
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bandhu, Sarvesh & Mondal, Bishwajyoti & Pramanik, Anup, 2022. "Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    3. Kofi A. A-O. Agyei-Henaku & Charlotte Badu-Prah & Francis Srofenyoh & Ferguson K. Gidiglo & Akua Agyeiwaa-Afrane & Justice G. Djokoto, 2024. "Citations of Publications on Foreign Direct Investments into Agribusiness: Nature, Variability and Drivers," SAGE Open, , vol. 14(1), pages 21582440241, February.
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    5. Achille Basile & Anna De Simone & Ciro Tarantino, 2022. "A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-19, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Binary social choice; Strategy-proofness; Positive welfare association; Status quo rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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