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Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)

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  • Kamada, Yuichiro
  • Kominers, Scott Duke

Abstract

We propose a simple model of repeated games with private monitoring and time-varying information structures. We then obtain an example demonstrating that the set of achievable equilibrium payoffs may shrink when players' information regarding opponents' information structures is increased.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamada, Yuichiro & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 112-114, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:112-114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 581-593.
    3. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November.
    4. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1990. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Tol, 2011. "Regulating knowledge monopolies: the case of the IPCC," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 108(4), pages 827-839, October.
    2. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/260962, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals," Working Papers 2072/249233, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    5. Daehyun Kim, 2019. "Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 267-285, March.
    6. António Osório, 2018. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 387-404, August.
    7. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2017. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/290761, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

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