IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v48y2019i1d10.1007_s00182-018-0643-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Daehyun Kim

    (UCLA)

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of an improvement of information structure upon the perfect public equilibrium payoff set in discounted stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. We first suggest three partial orders on information structures in stochastic games. Although each of them reduces to the notion of garbling in repeated games (Kandori in Rev Econ Stud 59:581–593, 1992), we find that an improvement of information in terms of our two garbling notions does not imply an expansion of the equilibrium payoff set for some games. We also show that more informativeness in terms of our third notion of garbling is sufficient for the expansion, thereby extending the well-known monotonicity result in Kandori (1992) to stochastic games.

Suggested Citation

  • Daehyun Kim, 2019. "Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 267-285, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0643-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0643-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-018-0643-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-018-0643-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    4. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 112-114, May.
    5. Mailath George J. & Matthews Steven A. & Sekiguchi Tadashi, 2002. "Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, June.
    6. Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
    7. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
    8. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
    9. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 581-593.
    10. Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2011. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(4), pages 1277-1318, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    2. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    4. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
    5. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018. "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 58-87.
    6. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 19 May 2018.
    7. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
    8. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
    9. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
    10. Abito, Jose Miguel & Chen, Cuicui, 2023. "A partial identification framework for dynamic games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    11. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
    13. Bruno Bassan & Olivier Gossner & Marco Scarsini & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Positive value of information in games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 17-31, December.
    14. de Oliveira, Henrique, 2018. "Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 126-131.
    15. Kimmo Berg, 2016. "Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 304-323, September.
    16. Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
    17. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
    18. Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals," Working Papers 2072/249233, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    20. Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023. "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1289-1327, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stochastic game; Blackwell sufficiency; Information structure; Public monitoring; Perfect public equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0643-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.