IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v36y1998i2p305-19.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Environmental Protection in the Federalist System: The Political Economy of NPDES Inspections

Author

Listed:
  • Helland, Eric

Abstract

This paper examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. The study evaluates three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy: (1) the federal case, which predicts that delegation has no effect; (2) the state/local model predicts that delegation is, in fact, abdication; and (3) the full impact model predicts that both interests determine how environmental policy is implemented. The results provide evidence that, while delegation does not completely remove national policymaker ability to alter regulatory policy, it does allow local interests to alter national standards. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Helland, Eric, 1998. "Environmental Protection in the Federalist System: The Political Economy of NPDES Inspections," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 305-319, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:2:p:305-19
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rachel Bouvier, 2009. "Determinants of Environmental Performance," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 23(2), pages 111-126, May.
    2. Jonathan Colmer & Mary F. Evans & Jay Shimshack, 2023. "Environmental citizen complaints," CEP Discussion Papers dp1903, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Magali Delmas & Ivan Montiel, 2009. "Greening the Supply Chain: When Is Customer Pressure Effective?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 171-201, March.
    4. Earnhart, Dietrich & Friesen, Lana, 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    5. Neal D. Woods, 2022. "Regulatory competition, administrative discretion, and environmental policy implementation," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 39(4), pages 486-511, July.
    6. Aaron A. Elrod & Serkan Karadas & Katherine C. Theyson, 2019. "The effect of gubernatorial political parties on monitoring and enforcement of federal environmental regulation: evidence from the Clean Water Act," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(2), pages 171-202, April.
    7. Sjöberg, Eric & Xu, Jing, 2018. "An Empirical Study of US Environmental Federalism: RCRA Enforcement From 1998 to 2011," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 253-263.
    8. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April.
    9. Haiqing Hu & Di Chen & Chun‐Ping Chang & Yin Chu, 2021. "The Political Economy Of Environmental Consequences: A Review Of The Empirical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 250-306, February.
    10. Fredriksson, Per G. & Matschke, Xenia & Minier, Jenny, 2010. "Environmental policy in majoritarian systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 177-191, March.
    11. Millimet, Daniel L., 2013. "Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 7831, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Han, Chao & Tian, Xian-Liang, 2022. "Less pollution under a more centralized environmental system: Evidence from vertical environmental reforms in China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    13. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2002. "Is there a 'California effect' in US environmental policymaking?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 737-764, November.
    14. Elbakidze, Levan & Beeson, Quinn, 2020. "State Regulatory Heterogeneity and Clean Water Act Compliance," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304638, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    15. Delmas, Magali A. & Montes-Sancho, Maria J., 2011. "U.S. state policies for renewable energy: Context and effectiveness," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2273-2288, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:2:p:305-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.