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Higher taxes at the top? The role of tax avoidance

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  • Uribe-Terán, Carlos

Abstract

How does the presence of endogenous tax compliance alter optimal taxation in the United States? Using a full-scale macroeconomic model augmented with endogenous tax avoidance, I show that extremely high marginal tax rates for top earners cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Revenue- and welfare-maximising tax rates range between 36.4% and 38.4% in the long run, which are very close to the status quo. These results are robust to the calibration of the labour supply’s Frisch elasticity, and the labour response explains, at most, 60% of the variation of taxable income in the short run. Moreover, tax hikes on top earners are not effective redistribution mechanisms in the presence of tax avoidance.

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  • Uribe-Terán, Carlos, 2021. "Higher taxes at the top? The role of tax avoidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:129:y:2021:i:c:s0165188921001226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104187
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal Taxation; Tax Administration; Fiscal Policy; Heterogeneous Agents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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